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Fair followers: Expanding access to generic pharmaceuticals for lowand middle-income populations
Kevin Outterson
————————————————————————————————————
1. From free riders and pirates to fair followers
US trade officials frequently employ the rhetoric of free riding and piracy when
discussing intellectual property (IP) rights for medicines (Benson 2005, Drahos with
Braithwaite 2002). The gentler term free rider is applied when developed country
(OECD) governments use monopsony power to negotiate price discounts on patented
pharmaceuticals (PhRMA 2005; US Department of Commerce 2004, Outterson 2004,
2005b). Poorer governments usually lack sufficient market power as a purchaser to
negotiate discounts for their low- and middle-income populations. In these cases,
governments and patients may resort to unlicensed generic drugs and compulsory
licensing. In response, US trade officials and IP owners inflame the rhetoric and label
such activity as piracy.
Free riders use something they didn’t pay for. The term itself calls to mind someone
riding a bus without paying the fare. But free riding is not limited to tangible goods and
services. With intangible property, free riding is not only possible, but in many ways
easier. Downloading music from the Internet is the new paradigm case for free riding.
Piracy is a crime against humanity. Pirates stole and destroyed wantonly. They raped
and killed with abandon. Piracy is an inappropriate term for providing essential
medicines to the world’s poorest people. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) broke the law
when it began offering antiretroviral therapy (ART) in Khayelitsha Township in South
Africa in 2001. The crime against humanity would have been a studied failure to act in
the face of the AIDS crisis.
The rhetoric of IP law should consider the economic structure of pharmaceutical
knowledge. Unlike tangible property, pharmaceutical knowledge does not suffer from
exhaustion or congestion. In economic terms, it is generally nonrivalrous. This paper
explores the powerful implications of that feature, and concludes that low- and middleincome populations should be encouraged to use pharmaceutical knowledge as fair
followers. In particular, fair followers should use low-cost generic versions of essential
patented medicines to maximize access, so long as incentives for innovation are not
harmed thereby.
2. Property rights are designed to resolve the problems of rivalry and appropriation
The dominant system of property rights makes eminent sense for traditional categories of
tangible goods. Physical things are subject to at least two problems which are addressed
by property rules: rivalry and appropriation.
Rivalry
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Any item which can suffer exhaustion or congestion is rivalrous. Congestion occurs when
too many people attempt simultaneous use: if everyone had equal claims to my car, then I
may not find it always available when I wanted it. Ten thousand people cannot
simultaneously sleep in the same bed, or farm the same small field, or eat my fig.
Exhaustion occurs when multiple users degrade the resource. Classic examples include
over-grazed fields and depleted fisheries. (Hardin 1968)
The OECD market-based economy relies on property rights as the primary solution to
rivalry. Ownership is entrusted to one person, and that person is given control of the
property’s use, including the right to exclude others. The owner takes the decisions
regarding use of their property, including issues of congestion and exhaustion. But
ownership is not absolute. Property owners are also subject to duties, particularly when
their actions negatively impact others. Property may also be taken for a public use with
compensation through the sovereign power of eminent domain.
Globalized legal and moral cultures generally respect private property. If someone takes
property without permission, we call them a thief. Moral norms cover similar ground,
but an exception might be made for a starving child taking an extra loaf of bread from a
wealthy family. In such a case the need is great and the loss is small, so perhaps taking
the property is morally justified. Similar moral sentiments have propelled MSF and their
Access to Essential Medicines Campaign. MSF campaigns for significantly lower drug
prices for the poor, even when the drugs are unauthorized generics or produced under a
compulsory license (MSF 2005a). The medical need is great and the damage from the
taking is miniscule. Action is not only appropriate, but may be a moral necessity. MSF
was not arrested as a pirate or a thief; instead they are celebrated for their service to
humanity.
Appropriation
The second problem addressed by property rules involves appropriation, or more
precisely, the inability to appropriate returns on common pool resources. Absent an
appropriation tool, no single individual retains an economic incentive to invest in
common pool resources. Few would purchase or maintain an automobile if they could not
control its subsequent use. The orchardist cares for her trees in the spring in anticipation
of a harvest in the autumn. Property rules permit a person (the ‘owner’) to appropriate the
fruits of their investment. It is thought that society generally benefits when owners invest
in their property, particularly if duties are imposed to account for negative externalities
like pollution.
Intangibles
Now consider the case of property rights for intangibles such as patents, copyrights, trade
secrets and the like. Intangibles are even more exposed to appropriation by strangers.
Stealing my car requires physical theft; taking my land will lead to adverse physical
occupation. Both are relatively easy to identify. Using a patent or trade secret without
permission may be harder to discover and easier to accomplish. Music and video files can
be copied anonymously over the Internet. Such copying can happen in many locations
2

simultaneously, all over the world. The artist and the distributor may never know.
Copying is also possible with pharmaceutical knowledge. For many years, India
produced unlicensed generic versions of drugs which were still under patent outside of
India. In many cases, these drugs were the best or only low-cost source for humanitarian
programs in Africa and elsewhere.
This type of activity might well reduce innovation incentives. Appropriation on IP
investments would be more difficult if many potential customers did not pay. IP laws
hinder misappropriation (or free riding) by creating temporary legal barriers such as
patents and copyrights. But the analogy between tangible and intangible property breaks
down on the question of rivalry. Tangible goods are rivalrous. They suffer from
exhaustion and congestion. But most intangibles are nonrivalrous, including the
biomedical knowledge which forms the basis of the pharmaceutical industry. Most
pharmaceutical knowledge is nonrivalrous, and this fact enables a transformation from
free riding and piracy to fair following.
3. Reconsidering moral and property rights in nonrivalrous pharmaceutical
knowledge
Different property rules might be appropriate for nonrivalrous knowledge. Bread is
consumed when eaten, but knowledge may be shared by an infinite number of persons
without exhaustion or congestion. Rivalry still afflicts the physical expressions of
knowledge, such as books and pills, but the underlying knowledge itself remains
nonrivalrous. Knowledge may be widely disseminated without creating shortages, a
potential boon for humanity.
Nonrivalrous goods may result in different moral rules concerning theft. Return to the
example of the starving child. Assume that a loaf of bread was a nonrivalrous good. The
Biblical example is Jesus feeding the crowds with miraculous bread and fish: as the
contents of the baskets were distributed by the disciples, more food appeared. Although
they began with only five loaves and two small fish, thousands were fed and the leftover
food filled twelve baskets (Matthew 14:13-21). In a world of nonrivalrous goods, the
moral imperative would require sharing. If the bus ride is truly free, let everyone ride.
Property laws must also be reconsidered. By definition, additional users can be added
without exhaustion, congestion, or other costs. If the appropriation (investment) problem
can be resolved, then the hegemony of absolutist property rules would crumble. If the
appropriation (investment) issue is resolved, there is no reason to strengthen IP rights
further to deny access to additional users, particularly when the users are low- and
medium-income populations faced with inadequate access to essential medicines.
For example, Lipitor (atorvastatin calcium) is an important lipid-reducing drug, patented
by Pfizer. The global medical need for reducing cholesterol is great, in both rich and
poor countries (WHO 2004). Generic drug companies could sell much cheaper dosages
without congestion or exhaustion, but doing so might diminish appropriation by Pfizer.
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To be successful, fair following must simultaneously improve access to generic Lipitor,
without undermining optimal innovation incentives for Pfizer.
The pharmaceutical industry frames the issue as intellectual property rights, with little
regard for potential IP duties. The industry assumes that maximizing IP laws and
therefore pharmaceutical appropriation is the best course of action (PhRMA 2006). But
the creation of property rights sometimes creates associated negative externalities, and
those negative externalities imply duties. With real property, the negative externality
could be pollution, and a possible duty is abatement. With pharmaceutical IP, one
prominent negative externality is inadequate access: millions (indeed, billions) of people
lack access to patented drugs which would improve health (Outterson 2005d). The duty
could be to permit fair following. Put another way, if appropriation (investment) issues
are resolved and the goods are nonrivalrous, then no reason remains to deny access to
additional users, especially for low- and medium-income populations facing inadequate
access to essential patented drugs.
The concept of an IP duty might seem radical, but it is already a prominent feature of US
food and drug law. The current US practice of permitting generic drug entry after patent
expiration is an imperfect application of this policy, embodied in the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Mindless maximization of pharmaceutical IP rights is bad public policy. Taken to its
logical conclusion, generic drugs would be abolished entirely. Consumers would pay
higher prices and many would suffer adverse health effects from inadequate access. The
more reasonable public policy option is to optimize pharmaceutical innovation
incentives, balancing access and innovation (Outterson 2005a, at 217-222).
Whatever one thinks of the balance struck for the US market, we have every reason to
suppose that optimization would result in different outcomes in other countries,
particularly amongst low-income populations. In such groups, their poverty will limit the
effectiveness of appropriation, permitting the relaxation of pharmaceutical IP laws.
Poverty also magnifies the damage that high drug prices inflict, strengthening the case for
earlier generic entry. But current US policy exports Hatch-Waxman to other countries
without appropriate modifications (Outterson 2005c). This fair followers proposal is an
attempt to reverse that policy.
The following section describes how pharmaceutical knowledge may be shared with lowand medium-income populations without damaging optimal innovation incentives. The
foundations for the global pharmaceutical IP system crumble if this appropriation
question is resolved.
4. Pharmaceutical rent extraction from low- and medium-income populations
should be limited
When it comes to the world’s low-income populations, pharmaceutical appropriation is
nearly irrelevant.
Low-income populations cannot contribute much to global
pharmaceutical rents in any case. They should be exempt from IP property rules based
upon appropriation. The economist F.M. Scherer recently described a similar proposal
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(Scherer 2004, at 1141), giving economic language to the human rights appeals by
essential medicines advocates like Médecins Sans Frontières. Scherer’s point is that any
pharmaceutical patent rent extraction from low-income populations is likely to be very
damaging to people and not very helpful to innovation. In a similar vein, Lanjouw and
Jack suggest that poor countries really shouldn’t be expected to contribute much towards
global pharmaceutical R&D, with the possible exception of locally endemic diseases
(Lanjouw & Jack 2004). Their proposal would effectively exempt low- and mediumincome countries from most pharmaceutical patent laws, permitting instantaneous generic
entry for global pharmaceutical innovation in these markets.
Pharmaceutical rent extraction amongst low-income populations is both cruel and
unnecessary: cruel because people will die when a life-extending treatment is possible,
but unaffordable; unnecessary because low-income populations would never have
contributed much towards global pharmaceutical rent extraction in any case. Low-income
populations have dramatically higher demand elasticities. Pricing AIDS drugs at
US$10,000 per year might be optimal in the US market (or not), but at that price virtually
no one in sub-Saharan Africa can afford them. Moreover, we know that the marginal cost
of production of these drugs is less than US$240 per year (MSF 2005b). Given these
facts, the very poorest cannot be expected to pay thousands of dollars for AIDS drugs.
Indeed, the poorest should not pay any patent appropriation rent for these drugs: the
extremely modest contribution from low-income populations is much more valuable to
them than it is to the global pharmaceutical industry. Middle-income populations present
a transitional case: some patent rent extraction might be appropriate, but full OECD
pricing would deny needed access.
These factors are not limited to AIDS drugs, but are present in many other chronic and
infectious conditions. Much of the global burden of disease is from conditions which are
truly global in nature: AIDS, cancer, cardiovascular disease, infections, and depression
(WHO 2004; Outterson 2005a, at 244-46). Global diseases afflict both rich and poor. For
global diseases, innovation is assured by demand in wealthy OECD countries.
Appropriation from low-income populations is not important for global disease
innovation. These drugs could be provided generically to the poorest without
undermining optimal innovation.
The same cannot be said for neglected diseases. The fair follower proposal neither
improves nor harms the prospects for neglected disease innovation. Fair following is
primarily geared to global diseases such as cancer, cardiovascular disease, diabetes,
depression and AIDS. Neglected diseases are endemic primarily in poor regions of the
world. Innovation has lagged because of the poverty of the afflicted. The very poorest are
not a good market, particularly when the wealthy countries have no need for the drug.
Several recent proposals attempt to correct this market failure by creating mechanisms
such as purchase commitments and prize funds (Kremer & Glennerster 2004, Hollis
2004). Many public-private partnerships have accelerated neglected disease research
(Moran, et al. 2005). Others look to non-market incentives such as grants and
government-sponsored research (Love 2003a-b, Hubbard 2003, but see DiMasi &
Grabowski 2004). Occasionally proposals are coupled with an expansion of IP rights in
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poor countries (Sykes 2002), but expanded IP rights are an unnecessary and unwelcome
addition. Expansion of IP rights will not create incentives in the absence of money to buy
the product. These diseases are neglected due to the poverty of the afflicted, not the lack
of IP rights (Outterson 2005a, at 241-46).
Pharmaceutical rent extraction is best accomplished in high-income populations, among
people who can afford expensive patented drugs. The burden of supporting innovation
should rest upon those with the ability to afford expensive medicines. This principle has
been embraced by pharmaceutical companies and major Western governments. Price
discrimination based upon ability to pay underlies all voluntary differential pricing
programs, as well as the recent Canadian legislation to permit export of compulsory
licensed pharmaceuticals for low-income populations. In the Canadian program, the
royalty varies with the poverty of the target country (The Jean Chretien Pledge to Africa
Act 2004). The United States Department of Commerce followed suit in December 2004
when it calculated pharmaceutical free riding by various OECD countries, with
adjustments for per-capita GDP (US Department of Commerce 2004, fig. 5). Highincome individuals typically have low demand elasticities for patented pharmaceuticals,
permitting both high prices and relatively modest access externalities. In such situations,
both clinical needs and innovation goals can be met simultaneously.
5. Fair following in practice
Several models of fair following are possible. Each one may potentially reach the same
end – providing low- and medium-income populations with affordable access to essential
drugs without harming optimal innovation incentives – but the legal forms differ widely.
They also differ wherein the authority lies to make a decision on granting access. The
four models discussed herein are: (1) compulsory licensure; (2) voluntary differential
pricing; (3) patent buy-outs; and (4) the proposed Global R&D Treaty.
5.1. Streamline and expand compulsory licensure
Compulsory licensure is the sovereign power to use a patent absent permission from the
patent owner. Compulsory licensure is often mischaracterized as ‘breaking a patent.’
Compulsory licensure is analogous to the power of eminent domain over real property,
with one important caveat: while eminent domain often takes the property completely,
compulsory licensure is only a partial taking. The owner retains all rights against all
other persons. Under US law, compensation must be paid to the patent owner.
Compulsory licensure is fully consistent with the WTO TRIPS Agreement. WTO
Members may compel licensure to protect public health, without limitation concerning
the disease or drug at issue. (Love 2005; WTO TRIPS Agreement 1994, at art. 31(f);
WTO Doha Declaration 2001, at ¶ 5; ‘t Hoen 2002, at 40-41)
Royalty rates for compulsory licenses should be modest when the intended recipients are
very poor. Canada has proposed royalty rates ranging from 4% down to 0.02%
depending upon the importing country’s level of poverty. While Canada’s law raises
many questions, (Outterson 2005a, at 229-232), it is clearly a step in the direction of fair
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following. Canada recognizes that pharmaceutical patent rent extraction is largely
inappropriate from low-income populations.
Sovereign threats of compulsory licensure have led to much lower prices. Prominent
examples include Brazil’s highly successful anti-retroviral program for AIDS (Bermudez
2002; U.K. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 2002; Reichman with Hasenzahl
2003, at 2; Benson 2005) and the October 2001 threat by the US government to issue a
compulsory license for Bayer’s Cipro (ciprofloxacin) during the anthrax scare (Carroll &
Winslow 2001, see also Reichman with Hasenzahl 2003, at 19-22). Most of the
affordable AIDS drugs listed in the MSF pricing guide were produced by Indian
companies as generics prior to the phase-out of the TRIPS flexibilities afforded to India
as a developing country (MSF 2005b). Even nominally voluntary licenses, such as
Merck’s grant to the South African-Indian company Thembalami Pharmaceuticals
(Merck & Co., Inc. 2004), are frequently a response to litigation and the threat of
compulsory licensing (Outterson 2005a, at 223-226). Roche’s experience with Tamiflu
(oseltamivir phosphate) is quite similar: Roche reluctantly agreed to discuss voluntary
licenses only when governments began to threaten compulsory licensure. The pressing
need to build stockpiles against an influenza epidemic goaded both governments and
Roche into action.
The US has consistently opposed compulsory licensure by other countries. In January
2001, the United States requested a WTO panel against Brazil to prevent Brazilian “local
manufacture” of AIDS drugs (WTO 2001). Under international pressure, the United
States withdrew the panel request in the months leading up to the Fourth WTO
Ministerial Conference in Doha (Thomas 2001, at 15; ‘t Hoen 2002, at 38-47). More
recently, US groups attacked Brazil in July 2005 over a proposed compulsory license of
Kaletra (lopinavir + ritonavir), an AIDS fixed-dose combination drug. The patent owner,
Abbott Laboratories, reached a voluntary price reduction agreement with Brazil which
made the formal compulsory license unnecessary, another demonstration of the power of
compulsory licenses to improve access (Benson 2005).
Compulsory licenses, like any good thing, can become dangerous if used to excess. The
power to issue compulsory licenses rests with the government where the patient resides
(in the case of an export under special WTO rules, a compulsory license must also be
issued by the exporting country). If this decision may be made unilaterally, a collective
action problem may result. Each country could resort to compulsory licensure
excessively, depressing global drug sales and retarding optimal innovation. This is
unlikely for at least three reasons. First, pressure from the United States Trade
Representative’s Office has coerced countries to abandon flexibilities inherent in the
WTO TRIPS Agreement, including compulsory licensure (Thorpe 2004). As a result, the
empirical use of compulsory licenses has been modest, outside of the examples discussed
above. Second, prior to the avian influenza scare, the United States has been the only
OECD country to recently display an appetite for compulsory licensure of a patented
drug (Carroll & Winslow 2001). OECD countries would in any case pay royalties to
compensate the patent holder for the non-exclusive use. If compulsory licensure is
limited to low- and medium-income populations, then the damage to optimal innovation
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incentives will be negligible. Finally, most OECD countries do not need to resort to
compulsory licensure at all, but may effectively control costs through the mechanism of
government pharmaceutical reimbursement (PhRMA 2005; US Dept. of Commerce
2004). The TRIPS Agreement does nothing to prevent OECD countries from effectively
holding down drug prices (and pharmaceutical rents) through these reimbursement
mechanisms (US Dept. of Commerce 2004; Outterson 2005b). This wealthy country free
riding is many orders of magnitude larger than any potential abuse by low-income
populations through compulsory licensure (Outterson 2005b, 2005c).
In short, if compulsory licensure for low-income populations was streamlined and greatly
expanded, it would do little or no damage to global pharmaceutical innovation, while
greatly improving global access to life-saving medicines.
5.2. Voluntary differential pricing
A second model is voluntary differential pricing. Drug companies suggest that greatly
improved generic access is not required because they can engage in voluntary differential
pricing programs. The drug companies retain exclusive ownership of the IP, but agree to
make the product available at reduced prices for some low-income populations.
Voluntary differential pricing could facilitate fair following if adopted for all essential
drugs and expanded to guarantee marginal cost pricing for all low- and medium-income
populations. It is highly unlikely to substantially achieve these goals. Millions have died
in Africa while waiting for AIDS drugs to actually reach them under publicly-announced
voluntary differential pricing programs. For other drugs and conditions not in the media
spotlight, the record of voluntary differential pricing programs is equally dismal.
These programs are generally limited to particular diseases, drugs or countries. Voluntary
differential prices are not nearly low enough, and are not generally priced at the marginal
cost of production. Voluntary differential pricing programs allow the drug companies to
retain full control. Countries are not able to act unilaterally, so the collective action
problem does not appear, but inadequate access remains. Establishing a few programs
may respond to a particularly compelling crisis or a public relations problem, but
pharmaceutical companies have no internalized economic incentive to systematically
address inadequate access. The empirical track record of voluntary differential pricing
programs has proven to be very disappointing as a comprehensive solution (Outterson
2005a, at 225-228). As discussed above, many notable programs have appeared only as
responses to threatened compulsory licensure.
To some extent, fear of pharmaceutical arbitrage from low-income markets to highincome markets has stifled drug company support for voluntary differential pricing.
Similar fears could also be raised against expanded use of compulsory licensure.
Empirically, such arbitrage is rarely observed, and need not be a significant threat to
optimal pharmaceutical innovation when proper tools are utilized to minimize leakage
(Outterson 2005a, at 257-260). For innovation purposes, the most important price
discrimination barrier is between OECD markets and the rest of the world. This is
exactly the same divide that fair follower models will utilize. Even within a single
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country, PhRMA has been able to deploy a myriad of legal, contractual, and unilateral
mechanisms to successfully price discriminate. Drug prices within the United States vary
dramatically between Medicaid, Medicare, 340b, Federal Supply Schedule, insurance
carriers, institutions (hospitals and nursing homes) and free clinics (Outterson 2005b).
The alleged dangers of pharmaceutical arbitrage may well be overstated (Outterson
2005a).
5.3. Purchase patents for generic production for low- and medium-income
populations
A third fair follower model is to leave IP laws undisturbed, but to simply purchase the
pharmaceutical patent rights for low- and medium-income populations. The purchased
patents would then be donated to the public domain, permitting marginal cost production
for the world’s poorest people. For example, patents could be purchased for the nonOECD world, and left in place for the wealthy OECD countries. The great majority of
pharmaceutical appropriation would still flow through the OECD market system; the
buy-out would cover only low- and medium-income populations and would be a
relatively modest part of global pharmaceutical sales. Appropriation would be supported
by the combination of the continuing rent extraction (patent laws) in high-income
markets and the buy-out prices for other markets. This is the patent buy-out model
(Ganslandt, Maskus & Wong 2001; Kremer 1998; Guell 1997; Guell & Fischbaum 1995;
Stein & Valery 2004).
5.3.1. Existing buy-out proposals
The common feature of patent buy-out proposals is to separate the market for innovation
from the market for drugs, particularly for the poor. (This feature is also shared by the
Global R&D Treaty, discussed in section 5.4 below). If patents are purchased and then
donated to the public domain, competition will permit the widest possible distribution at
the lowest possible market price, freed from the distortions, rent-seeking and
inefficiencies inherent in monopolistic pricing through patents. Guell and Fischbaum
make this case plainly, although their focus is primarily upon buy-outs for the US market
(Guell and Fischbaum 1995). The access improvements they describe would be even
greater amongst low-income populations with higher demand elasticities. Kremer’s
proposal is primarily an incentive for neglected disease innovation (Kremer 1998).
Kremer would create a market for a neglected disease innovation by making a credible
promise to purchase the patent at an attractive price. Purchasing the patent enables
generic production, but Kremer’s focus is on the innovation side of the problem. Kremer
has also proposed a commitment to purchase large quantities of the item (such as a drug
or vaccine), leaving the patent in place (Kremer & Glennerster 2004). Stein and Valery
reject patent buy-outs as a solution for the US market, and make the case for the federal
government entering the drug business as a full competitor (Stein and Valery 2004, at
153-54). Their only proffered reason for rejecting patent buy-outs is the failure to reduce
overall patent rents, completely ignoring the access and allocative efficiency gains
described by Guell and Fischbaum. Patent buy-outs need not alter patent rents (for that
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would affect innovation), but merely separate innovation from production, and permit the
widest possible access to pharmaceutical innovation at generic prices.
5.3.2. Patent buy-outs for low- and medium-income populations
Three existing proposals could be considered fair following because they focus on lowand medium-income populations: the DEFEND proposal by Ganslandt, Maskus and
Wong (Ganslandt, Maskus and Wong 2004); the patent option proposal by Lanjouw and
Jack (Lanjouw and Jack 2004); and F.M. Scherer’s article encouraging poor countries to
free ride on pharmaceutical patents (Scherer 2004). Ganslandt, Maskus and Wong
suggest a buy-out of exclusive pharmaceutical licenses for poor countries. Their
DEFEND proposal and Scherer’s article are generally consistent with my own views,
with some caveats described below. Lanjouw & Jack do not utilize buy-outs at all, but
force pharmaceutical companies to choose between patenting the drug in rich countries or
poor countries, but not both (Lanjouw and Jack 2004). For global diseases, drug
companies will always choose to patent in rich countries. In effect, Lanjouw and Jack
permit generic production of any global disease drug for poor countries without the
expense of a buy-out. This proposal enjoys the virtues of simplicity and economy, but to
the extent we are concerned about maintaining optimal innovation incentives, some
payment should be considered for market rights, at least in middle-income countries.
Lanjouw and Jack also ignore the political realities of PhRMA and USTR’s joint
campaign over the past 15 years to establish a single global standard for pharmaceutical
IP.
Patent buy-outs have great potential to improve access to life-saving medicines. In 2004
the global R&D cost recovery from non-OECD markets for all anti-retroviral (ARV)
drugs was less than US$110 million per year. In all of Francophone West Africa,
commercial sales of ARVs were only US$33,000 in 2004, according to IMS data (IMS
Health 2005a). Retail sales of branded NRTI AIDS drugs in Peru have never exceeded
US$19,000 per year (IMS Health 2005b). In short, the indicated buy-out price for ARVs
for these regions of the world is quite modest, cutting the Gordian knot of the global
AIDS patent battles. Anything which lowers treatment costs for effective AIDS drugs
should be deployed in the face of this global health catastrophe.
Patent buy-outs are controlled by the wealthy donor (a foundation or government) rather
than the country wherein the potential patient resides. One collective action problem is
avoided, but the target country lacks control over one important element of the health and
safety of its citizens. Unless a global mechanism is created to buy-out all global
pharmaceutical IP for low- and medium-income populations, then the target countries
will be dependent upon continued foreign charity.
5.3.3. Setting the buy-out price
The buy-out price must be set high enough to optimize global pharmaceutical innovation
and low enough to be affordable as a routine finance mechanism. Lanjouw and Jack
effectively set the price at zero by requiring drug companies to choose between patents in
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rich countries or poor countries. If global pharmaceutical appropriation is already supraoptimal, then zero (or a negative value) is the correct price (Outterson 2005a, at 220222). Policymakers should have transparent access to reliable data on global
pharmaceutical innovation in order to answer that question. Drug company surveys
based upon unverifiable data should not be relied upon for this important question.
If the goal of the buy-out price is to mimic what would have happened under best-case
competitive market conditions, then the price should be based on expected profits rather
than sales or costs. Ganslandt, Maskus and Wong (2001) used cost data to calculate the
buy-out, which rewards effort rather than success. Gross sales are certainly an element of
pharmaceutical appropriation, but the relevant market metrics are the net present value
(NPV) of the cash flow or the NPV of the profit stream. The purpose of the buy-out price
should be to restore the expected profits, and more particularly, the lost R&D cost
recovery.
Expected future profits will of course be difficult to estimate. The following formula
relies to the greatest extent possible on externally generated data, to avoid data
manipulation and methodological squabbles, with retrospective experience adjustments:
BOP = NPVt d (U t * MCP) p
BOP is the buy-out price; NPV is the net present value over the patent period t at
discount rate d; U is the number of generic units sold in the target markets by all sellers
during t; and MCP is the marginal cost of production per unit, estimated as 90% of the
lowest sustained ex-factory actual price per unit during t; p is a profit adjustor, reflecting
the percentage of revenues allocated to R&D cost recovery (14-17% are the estimates
from drug companies). Estimated payments could be made at buy-out, subject to
periodic and retrospective adjustment as actual data developed on U and MCP, and
perhaps for changes in d. The formula avoids any need to know actual costs, profits, or
average sales prices. The only data required are aggregate generic unit sales and the
lowest sustained ex-factory price by any generic seller in the target markets. Both are
relatively easy to collect and difficult for the patent holder (or anyone else) to manipulate.
This formula aligns incentives against rent-seeking and allocative inefficiency in helpful
ways. The buy-out permits any pharmaceutical company to manufacture and sell the drug
generically in all target markets. Competition will drive the unit price down towards the
actual marginal cost of production. In a competitive market with multiple entrants, no
single company controls either U or MCP, but they each have strong market incentives to
maximize U and to minimize MCP, which translates into the greatest access for a marketdetermined optimal price.
5.4. The proposed Global R&D Treaty
The fourth model is both simple and powerful: a global treaty on medical innovation.
James Love, Tim Hubbard and a growing chorus of other commentators have discussed a
Global R&D Treaty to separate the global market for innovation from the market for drug
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sales (Love 2003a-b; Hubbard 2003; Hollis 2004; Baker 2004; but see DiMasi &
Grabowski 2004). In January 2006, Kenya and Brazil introduced a resolution to the
World Health Organization Executive Board calling for a serious evaluation of the
proposal (WHO 2006). The R&D Treaty would serve as a global coordination
mechanism to prevent free riding by high-income countries, while clearly specifying the
fair following obligations of poorer countries. The Treaty does not commit any country to
a particular method of meeting its R&D obligations. Each country retains considerable
flexibility. A country could keep (or expand) pharmaceutical patent rent appropriation if
it desired, but it could also meet Treaty obligations through government financed R&D,
purchase commitments, patent buy-outs, prize funds, or some other mechanism.
One advantage of the Treaty is that many countries could choose to abandon the patent
system as the appropriation tool for pharmaceutical innovation. Problems of inadequate
access, inefficiency of allocations, counterfeiting and rent-seeking behavior by drug firms
could be reduced if innovation was not dependant upon the high retail sales price of
patented drugs. Every drug could be a generic, with innovation incentives addressed
through the Treaty.
If the Global R&D Treaty were adopted, one could expect quite different drug price
levels in various countries, depending upon the Treaty mechanisms chosen for
innovation. If so, cross-border pharmaceutical arbitrage would need to be blocked from
entering those countries which attempted to support innovation through high retail drug
prices. As stated above, empirically, this type of arbitrage has been more limited than
often supposed and is susceptible to effective legal interdiction and control (Outterson
2005a, at 205, 231-35, 261-67, 275-91).
6. Conclusion
The world is facing a pharmaceutical access crisis. For rivalrous goods like food and cell
phones, rationing scarce resources is a necessity. For nonrivalrous intangibles like
pharmaceutical knowledge, a different world is possible. We must demand to know why
rationing separates most of humanity from effective access to life-saving drugs. The
primary answer offered by pharmaceutical companies is innovation. The discussion then
descends into name calling: anyone who challenges the dominant IP system is at best a
free rider and at worst a pirate. The purpose of this essay is to transcend this impasse, and
to offer fair follower alternatives which preserve innovation whilst greatly expanding
access.
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